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This paper reviews various techniques for quantifying financial incentives to work, shows 
how financial work incentives have changed across the population since 1979, and 
estimates how much of these changes are due to changes in the tax and benefit system.   
Two aspects of financial work incentives are important: the incentive to be in work at all, 
and the incentive to progress in work (i.e. increase earnings). We measure the incentive to 
progress using the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR); we measure the incentive to work 
at all using the replacement rate (RR) and the participation tax rate (PTR). In all three 
cases, higher rates correspond to weaker work incentives. 
Our measures of incentives incorporate income tax, employee National Insurance 
contributions, council tax, tax credits and social security benefits; they do not take 
account of taxes formally incident on companies (such as employer National Insurance 
contributions) or indirect taxes. 
We find that work incentives are generally weaker for people who are not working than 
for people who are working. However, such analysis requires us to estimate what wages 
non-workers would command if they did work; concerns about the reliability of these 
estimates mean that for most of our analysis we restrict attention to people in work. 
The weakest work incentives are faced by people on low incomes who face having their 
means-tested benefits or tax credits withdrawn if they increase their income. Such 
disincentives are much greater than those imposed on high-income people through 
higher rates of income tax. Over two million workers in Britain stand to lose more than 
half of any increase in earnings to taxes and reduced benefits. Some 160,000 would keep 
less than 10p of each extra £1 they earned. 
                                                 
1 Adam, Brewer and Shephard are all at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Contact: mike_b@ifs.org.uk. This paper was 
produced as part of a project called “Can Governments reduce poverty and improve work incentives?”, supported by 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) as part of its programme of research and innovative development projects, 
which it hopes will be of value to policy-makers, practitioners and service users. The facts presented and views 
expressed in this paper, however, are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Foundation, nor of the 
other individuals or institutions mentioned here, including the Institute for Fiscal Studies, which has no corporate 
view. The authors are very grateful to Chris Goulden, the project manager at JRF, and to the Advisory Group. Howard 
Reed was originally the manager of the project that led to this report, and the authors are grateful for his contributions. 
Material from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) was made available by the Office for National Statistics through 
the UK Data Archive and has been used by permission of the Controller of HMSO. Material from the Family 
Resources Survey (FRS) was made available by the Department for Work and Pensions, and is also available at the UK 
Data Archive. 
1 Different groups in society face different work incentives. Lone parents face some of the 
weakest incentives to work at all, and face weak incentives to earn more, because many 
will be subject to withdrawal of a tax credit or means-tested benefit as their earnings rise: 
over two-thirds of working lone parents face an EMTR in excess of 50 per cent. On the 
other hand, single adults without children face some of the strongest incentives, mostly 
because they are entitled to relatively little support when they do not work, and because 
they are not likely to be entitled to tax credits or means-tested benefits when they are in 
work. People living with a partner and with dependent children tend to have weaker 
work incentives in general than those without children, partly because they are more 
likely to be older and earn more, and therefore subject to the higher rate of income tax, 
but also because they are more likely to be subject to tax credit withdrawal.  
Both incentives to work at all and incentives to progress have strengthened, on average, 
since 1979, but have weakened on average since 2000. Only part of these changes in 
work incentives are the direct result of tax and benefit reforms: changes in average wages, 
wage inequality, rent levels and working patterns within two-adult families are also 
important explanatory factors.  
Separating out these various factors shows that tax and benefit reforms since 1979 have 
strengthened work incentives on average, although the precise trends vary by family type. 
Across the whole population, reforms under the Conservatives acted to strengthen 
average work incentives whereas Labour’s reforms to date have acted to weaken average 
work incentives. On average, tax and benefit changes since 1997 mean that someone 
choosing to work harder gets to keep 2½p less of each extra £1 they earn. However, 
these trends have not been uniform: the Conservatives’ reforms weakened work 
incentives for a period in the early 1980s, and Labour’s reforms have strengthened 
incentives for lone parents to work at all, and have strengthened incentives to earn more 
for some groups previously facing the weakest incentives. 
Growth in real wages over the period has tended to strengthen average incentives to 
work at all (as measured by replacement rates), but has had little effect on average 
incentives to progress, weakening them very slightly overall. Other changes in the 
economy, such as the growth in real rents acting through housing benefit, have tended to 
weaken both the incentive to work at all and the incentive to progress. 
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3 1. Introduction 
Since 1997, the UK Government has made a series of changes to taxes and benefits with 
the twin aims of reducing child and pensioner poverty and ‘making work pay’. Much is 
known about how recent tax and benefit changes in the UK have contributed to changes 
in poverty and inequality. 2 Less is known about how those same reforms have affected 
financial incentives to work. 3 This paper reviews various techniques for quantifying 
financial incentives to work, shows how financial work incentives have changed across 
the population since 1979, and estimates how much of these changes are due to changes 
in the tax and benefit system.  The material in this paper is summarised and built upon in 
Adam et al (2006), which also explores the trade-off between strengthening work 
incentives and redistributing income. 
Economists usually think of tax and benefit programmes as affecting work incentives in 
two ways: through an income effect and a substitution effect. The income effect refers to 
the idea that higher taxes or lower benefits make people worse off and so more inclined 
to seek to increase their earnings to make up for this lost income. The substitution effect 
refers to the idea that income taxes or means testing discourage work by reducing the 
reward for additional work: higher incomes can only be obtained with a greater increase 
in hours worked or work effort because recipients see some of the gain from increasing 
their private income taken in tax or offset by reductions in tax credit and benefit 
entitlement. Some models attempt to make inferences about the size of income and 
substitution effects based on individuals’ responses to past tax and benefit changes (see 
Brewer et al (2005a) for an example, and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a wider 
review), and it is these sorts of models that tell us that financial incentives do matter to 
individuals’ – and especially mothers’ – decisions of whether and how much to work. But 
all such estimates remain controversial and laden with assumptions, and we do not 
espouse any here. In this paper, therefore, we estimate only the direct effects of policies 
on work incentives: we do not estimate how far people respond to these incentives and 
therefore the ultimate effect of policies on employment and earnings.  
The rest of the report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews various techniques of 
quantifying the financial incentives to work, and shows how financial work incentives 
vary across the population in 2005–06. Chapter 3 shows the key trends since 1979, and 
estimates how much of the changes are due to changes in the tax and benefit system.  
Much of our analysis is based on measures of work incentives produced by the IFS’s tax 
and benefit micro-simulation model, TAXBEN.  T A X B E N  i s  a b l e  t o  u s e  d a t a  f r o m  
Family Resources Survey and the Family Expenditure Survey. The Family Resources 
Survey an annual cross-section survey of 27,000 households in Great Britain, and began 
in 1994. The Family Expenditure Survey is an annual cross-section survey of around 
                                                 
2  See Brewer, Goodman, Shaw and Sibieta (2006) on the income distribution and relative poverty now, Sutherland et 
al (2004) or Brewer, Clark and Goodman (2002) on how tax and benefit changes have affected child poverty, and Clark 
and Leicester (2004) on how tax and benefit changes have affected inequality. 
3 The impact of the working families’ tax credit and related reforms on lone parents has been thoroughly investigated 
by a number of studies, and recent work by some of the authors of this report has examined how tax and benefit 
changes since 1997 have affected work incentives across the population. See Brewer and Browne (2006) for a review of 
the former, and Brewer and Shephard (2004, 2005) for the latter.  
4 7,000 households in the UK, available from the 1960s through to 2000–01. The analysis 
uses the Family Expenditure Survey until 1993, and the Family Resources Survey 
between 1994–95 and 2002–03. Years refer to calendar years until 1993, and then 
financial years.  Synthetic data for 2003–04 – 2005–06 was created by uprating data from 
2002–03, as described in Brewer, Browne and Sutherland (2006). The analysis of work 
incentives in this report is restricted to working individuals in families in which no-one is 
self-employed, aged over 55 or receiving a disability benefit. Individuals with particularly 
complicated budget constraints, who did not have an hourly wage or who had extreme 
values of measures of work incentives were also omitted from the analysis. Details of the 
final samples used are available from the authors. 
5 2.  Measuring financial work incentives 
This chapter defines some important measures of financial work incentives (2.1-2.2), and 
presents an overview of financial work incentives in Britain in 2005 (2.3), showing what 
types of people tend to face strong or weak financial work incentives. It also discusses a 
number of detailed issues involved when measuring financial work incentives using a 
micro-simulation model (2.4).  
2.1.  Defining our main measures of financial work incentives 
An individual’s financial incentive to work will depend on the shape of the relationship 
between hours of paid work and net income, taking account of the financial costs of 
working and not working.4 This relationship is known as a “budget constraint”: see 
Figure 2.1a for an example. Budget constraints tell us all we might want to know about 
the financial incentives to work for an individual, but it is often preferable to summarise 
this information in some convenient measure. When doing so, there are two important 
dimensions of the budget constraint that we attempt to quantify: 
•  the financial reward for working compared to not working, measured by some 
function of incomes in and out of work, which we call the incentive to work at 
all.  
•  The incentive to for those in work to work harder or earn more, which we call 
the incentive to progress in the labour market.  
2.1.1  The incentive to work at all 
Two common measures of the incentive to work at all are the replacement rate, and the 
participation tax rate: 5   
i.  The replacement rate (RR) is measured by (net income out of work) / (net 
income in work).  For example, if someone would receive £50 in benefits if they 
did not work, and would have a net income of £200 if they worked, then the 
replacement rate is 50/200 or 0.25. 
ii.  The participation tax rate (PTR) is measured by 1 – {(net income in work – net 
income out of work) / gross earnings}, or one minus the financial gain to 
working as a proportion of gross earnings. It measures the proportion of gross 
earnings taken in tax or reduced benefits. To continue the previous example, if 
that person had gross earnings of £250, then the participation tax rate would be 1 
– (200-50)/250, or 0.4. 
A number of points apply to both of these measures:  
                                                 
4  “Net income” means income after benefits and tax credits have been added and after direct taxes have been 
deducted. 
5 Gregg et al (1999) call the latter concept the average tax rate, although the average tax rate is usually defined to mean 
total tax paid divided by total gross income, with no reference to out-of-work benefits or tax credits forgone.  
6 •  “net income” means income after benefits and tax credits have been 
added and after direct taxes have been deducted.  
•  Low numbers of both mean stronger financial incentives to work: a 
participation tax rate of zero would mean that an individual got to keep 
all of their gross earnings, and lost no benefits or tax credits, when they 
worked; a replacement rate of zero occurs where someone has no income 
if they do not work. At the other extreme, a PTR or an RR of one would 
mean that there is no financial reward to working. High PTRs or RRs are 
often referred to as the unemployment trap. 
•  Interpreting differences in these measures between individuals who are 
working different numbers of hours can be problematic, and this is why, 
in the later empirical analysis, we hold hours of work constant when 
comparing these measures between individuals and over time.  
•  Calculating either measure for non-workers requires assumptions about 
what they would earn if they did work.  
•  For individuals in couples, we can calculate the replacement rate and 
participation tax rate using individual or family income, and this choice 
will affect our impression of the strength of the financial reward to work. 
For example, a low-earning person living with a high-earning partner may 
have no independent income if he or she does not work, and therefore 
would have a very low replacement rate – or a strong financial incentive 
to work – when calculated using individual income. However, the same 
individual would have a very high replacement rate when calculated using 
family income, because whether he or she works makes little difference 
proportionally to the family’s income. By contrast, the participation tax 
rate for this individual is likely to be very low (if the individual is only 
paying income tax and employee national insurance contributions on a 
small portion of their earnings, and is in a family too rich to be entitled to 
tax credits) regardless of whether individual or family income is used for 
the calculation. 
Both these measures attempt to capture the incentive to work at all, but they are 
different, and as a result of this, these measures behave differently following different 
sorts of changes in income. In particular: 
•  A constant increase in income at all hours (in other words, an equal cash gain in 
in-work and out-of-work incomes, or a vertical shift in the budget constraint) 
does not change the participation tax rate, but increases the replacement rate. 
This means that the PTR would suggest no change in incentives, but the RR that 
they have got weaker.  
•  At a given level of hours of work, an increase in the gross hourly wage will 
strengthen incentives according to the RR, but will have ambiguous effects 
according to the PTR. 
7 According to economic theory, the impact of an equal cash gain in in-work and out-of-
work incomes should be to reduce the attractiveness of working compared to not 
working, and the impact of an increase in the hourly wage should be the reverse. This 
means, then, that for these two very simple thought experiments, the replacement rate 
accords with the intuition from simple economic theory. However, the participation tax 
rate better captures how the tax and benefit system affects the incentive to work: it 
distinguishes between whether a reduced reward to work is caused by higher taxes or 
lower wages, for example, which the replacement rate does not. And, as discussed above, 
the two measures can give very different impressions of the incentive to work faced by 
adults in a couple. Therefore, much of the empirical analysis that follows will use both 
measures. 
Other ways of measuring the incentive to work at all  
There are other ways of measuring the financial incentive to work at all, such as the 
financial gain to work (the difference between income in work and income out of work) 
and the average tax rate (total taxes paid (less in-work benefits received) divided by gross 
earnings). Like the RR and PTR, these are convenient ways of summarising the shape of 
the budget constraint. In addition, in a rather specialised study, Giles et al (1996) analysed 
the work incentives facing adults in rented accommodation by estimating the number of 
weekly hours of work needed to exhaust entitlement to housing benefit. Housing benefit 
is important when considering work incentives because recipients of housing benefit face 
a high EMTR until their incomes have risen to the point where they are no longer 
entitled. The measure used in Giles et al (1996) attempts to capture how far these high 
EMTRs affect an individual. Clearly, the more hours that must be worked until 
entitlement is exhausted, the weaker is the incentive to work. Individuals with high wages 
and low rents will need to work fewer hours before entitlement is exhausted. The 
drawbacks of this measure are, though, that it’s rather arbitrary, and very specific to a 
particular set of individuals, and a specific tax and benefit system: not all individuals are 
entitled to housing benefit, even when they have a low income. 
2.1.2  The incentive to progress in the labour market 
The incentive for those in work to progress in the labour market can be measured by the 
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), the slope of the budget constraint. The EMTR 
measures how much of a small change in earnings is lost to direct tax payments and 
foregone state benefit and tax credit entitlements, and it tells us about the strength of the 
incentive for individuals to increase their earnings slightly, whether through working 
more hours, or through promotion, qualifying for bonus payments or getting a better-
paid job. In this paper, we use the term “incentives to progress” for all these possibilities.   
As with the incentive to work at all, low numbers mean stronger financial incentives. An 
EMTR of zero means that the individual keeps all of any small change in earnings, and a 
rate of 1 (or 100%) means that the individual keeps none. High EMTRs amongst 
workers in low-income families are often referred to as the poverty trap. 
Another measure of the incentive to progress would be the net hourly wage: the amount 
(in £) by which an individual’s net income would rise were she to work an extra hour. 
8 Like the RR relative to the PTR, this can sometimes accord better with economic theory 
than the EMTR: for example, a rise in the gross hourly wage will affect the net wage in 
the same way as a fall in the tax rate (unlike with the EMTR), reflecting the prediction 
from economic theory that people will respond in the same way to both changes. We do 
not use this measure because of the difficulty in understanding changes in the net wage 
over a period when gross wages have changed markedly: it is more useful when 
comparing incentives to progress at a point in time. 6
2.2.  Relating work incentive measures to the budget constraint 
All the standard work-incentives measures can be related to – and derived from – a 
standard budget constraint diagram. The four diagrams below show the relationship 
between the budget constraint (the relationship between gross earning and net income 
after taxes and benefits) and the three main measures of work incentives discussed here. 
Figure 2.1a shows a hypothetical budget constraint (for a lone parent with 1 child aged 3 
earning £6 an hour with no housing benefit entitlement, no formal childcare costs, but 
liable to average (England and Wales)Band D council tax, all under the April 2005 tax 
and benefit system).  
The EMTR – our measure of incentives to progress in the labour market – is reflected in 
the slope of this line, and is shown in Figure 2.1b. EMTRs of 100% occur when an 
individual is entitled to income support and every pound of private earnings above the 
disregard reduces the income support payment by a pound. 
Figure 2.1a. A budget constraint for a lone parent with 1 child, April 2005 tax and 































Notes and sources: a and c are the levels of gross earnings and net income respectively for this person if 
they work 16 hours, and b is their net income (from benefits) if they do not work. Authors’ calculations 
                                                 
6 A measure that reflects the changing slope of the budget constraint is its convexity. Budget constraints are convex 
when EMTRs rise with incomes, so a measure of convexity tells us how quickly EMTRs rise or fall with income: 
studies including Zarutskie (2003) and Hubbard and Gentry (2004) have used it as a measure of how well the tax and 
benefit systems provides insurance against income risk. 
9 using TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and benefit system. See text for details of corresponding example 
family type. 
 











































Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and benefit system. See 
text for details of corresponding example family type. 
 
Figures 2.1c and d show the two measures of the financial incentive to work at all: the 
replacement rate (2.1c) and the participation tax rate (2.1d). The dashed lines on Figure 
2.1a show how these are calculated for someone working 16 hours a week. This person 
would have gross earnings of a, would receive b in benefits if they did not work, and 
would have a net income of c if they worked 16 hours. The formula for the replacement 
rate at 16 hours is b/c, and the formula for the participation tax rate is 1-(c-b)/a. 




























Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN under April 2004 tax and benefit system. See 
text for details of corresponding example family type. 
 






































Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN under April 2004 tax and benefit system. See 
text for details of corresponding example family type. 
 
11 2.3.  Financial work incentives in Britain in 2005: an overview 
This section presents an overview of financial work incentives for people working in 
Britain in 2005, showing what types of people tend to face strong or weak financial work 
incentives. We begin by showing the distribution of replacement rates, participation tax 
rates and effective marginal tax rates amongst working age adults under the April 2005 
tax and benefit system. We then show how the distribution of work incentives varies 
between different family types. Full details of the way we construct these measures is 
given in section 2.4, which also shows how different ways of estimating work incentives 
in a micro-simulation model affect our impression of the distribution of work incentives 
in Britain. 
2.3.1  Work incentives for all working adults 
The distribution of replacement rates is shown in Table 2.1. The most common range of 
replacement rates faced by working-age working adults in 2005 is between 50% and 60%, 
where around 2.75 million adults are located (this means that these adults’ families would 
receive 50-60% of their current income if the individual stopped work). Almost 70% of 
individuals face replacement rates between 20% and 70%, and the distribution of 
replacement rates is roughly symmetric: there is a similar number of people with very 
high replacement rates (weak work incentives) as with very low replacement rates (strong 
work incentives). 
Amongst the population as a whole, there are several factors that lead to this variation in 
replacement rates: individuals could be facing high replacement rates if they have a low 
wage, only work a few hours every week, or if the tax and benefit systems means that 
they face high levels of out-of-work income. Understanding the variation in replacements 
rates is much more straightforward when examining the incentives within different family 
groups, because most of the variation in replacement rates within family groups is 
derived from variation in wages. 
Table 2.1. Replacement rates amongst working adults 
  Number of working adults with rate in 
this band 
Number who face rate in or 
higher than this band 
0% 50,000  17,800,000 
0.1% - 10%  470,000  17,740,000 
10.1% - 20%   1,640,000  17,270,000 
20.1%–30% 2,400,000  15,630,000 
30.1%–40% 2,180,000  13,230,000 
40.1%–50% 2,640,000  11,050,000 
50.1%–60% 2,750,000  8,410,000 
60.1%–70% 2,100,000  5,660,000 
70.1%–80% 1,690,000  3,560,000 
80.1%–90% 1,270,000  1,870,000 
90.1%–100% 560,000  600,000 
Over 100%  40,000  40,000 
All 17,800,000   
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes adults aged over 55, the self-employed, adults receiving a disability benefit, and 
other adults living in these families. Figures grossed up using FRS weights and rounded to nearest 10,000. 
Numbers may not add because of rounding. See section 2.4 for details. 
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Table 2.2 shows that the most common participation tax rate band is between 30% and 
40%, with 5.1 million individuals facing rates in this range. Unlike the distribution of 
replacement rates, the distribution of participation tax rates is skewed to the lower end. 
Table 2.2. Participation tax rates amongst working adults 
  Number of working adults with rate in 
this band 
Number who face rate in or 
higher than this band 
0% 500,000  17,800,000 
0.1% - 10%  570,000  17,320,000 
10.1% - 20%   1,450,000  16,750,000 
20.1%–30% 4,490,000  15,300,000 
30.1%–40% 4,610,000  10,810,000 
40.1%–50% 2,870,000  6,200,000 
50.1%–60% 1,610,000  3,330,000 
60.1%–70% 850,000  1,720,000 
70.1%–80% 520,000  870,000 
80.1%–90% 260,000  350,000 
90.1%–100% 50,000  90,000 
Over 100%  40,000  40,000 
All 17,800,000   
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes adults aged over 55, the self-employed, adults receiving a disability benefit, and 
other adults living in these families. Figures grossed up using FRS weights and rounded to nearest 10,000. 
Numbers may not add because of rounding. See section 2.4 for details. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of EMTRs.7 This distribution has a large spike at tax 
rates of between 30% and 40%: nearly two thirds of working adults have EMTRs in this 
range. This can be easily understood in terms of the parameters of the tax and benefit 
system: the single most common EMTR faced by workers under the April 2005 tax and 
benefit system is 33 per cent, the rate that applies to adults whose own earnings are high 
enough to pay basic-rate income tax, but lower than the upper earnings limit in national 
insurance, and with a family income sufficiently high that they have no entitlements to 
means-tested benefits or tax credits (beyond the family element of the child tax credit). 
This band also includes people who pay the higher-rate of income tax and are contracted 
out of the state second pension. 
                                                 
7 Table 4.2 of HMT (2006) shows similar estimates. The key differences between the two tables are that:: a) the 
Treasury’s estimates only apply to people working at least 16 hours a week; ours apply to anyone working any hours; b) 
the Treasury’s estimates count the number of families, ours count the number of workers; c) the Treasury’s estimates 
incorporate some non-take-up of tax credits and means-tested benefits, ours assume full-take-up.  
13 Table 2.3. Effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) amongst working adults 
  Number of working adults with rate in 
this band 
Number who face rate in or 
higher than this band 
0% 560,000  17,800,000 
0.1% - 10%  110,000  17,240,000 
10.1% - 20%   250,000  17,130,000 
20.1%–30% 1,640,000  16,880,000 
30.1%–40% 10,900,000  15,240,000 
40.1%–50% 2,130,000  4,340,000 
50.1%–60% 240,000  2,210,000 
60.1%–70% 1,390,000  1,970,000 
70.1%–80% 180,000  580,000 
80.1%–90% 240,000  400,000 
90.1%–100% 120,000  160,000 
Over 100%  40,000  40,000 
All 17,800,000   
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes adults aged over 55, the self-employed, adults receiving a disability benefit, and 
other adults living in these families. Figures grossed up using FRS weights and rounded to nearest 10,000. 
Numbers may not add because of rounding. Marginal effective tax rates calculated by increasing hours of 
work by 5%. See section 2.4 for details. 
 
EMTRs of 20% or below – which apply to just under 5% of working adults – are faced 
by low-earning adults who earn too little to pay basic-rate income tax, and who live either 
in families who are too rich to be subject to withdrawal of in-work support (because they 
live with a high-earning partner) or on families whose joint income is sufficiently low so 
that the adults are not subject to a withdrawal or means-tested benefits or tax credits (in 
other words, these are low-earning individuals in either very low-income or relative high-
income families). 
EMTRs between 40% and 50% - which is the second most numerous range of marginal 
tax rates - tend to apply to adults who earn enough to pay the higher rate of income tax. 
EMTRs beyond this – and there are around 2.2m workers who face EMTRs in excess of 
50 per cent – almost always arise when adults live in a family whose income means that 
they face a withdrawal of a means-tested benefit or a tax credit. Indeed, the highest 
EMTRs arise when adults are eligible for more than one means-tested benefit or tax 
credit, usually housing benefit or council tax benefit in conjunction with tax credits: in 
April 2005, an individual facing simultaneous withdrawal of tax credits and housing 
benefit as well as basic rate income tax and standard rate NICs would face an effective 
marginal tax rate of 89.5% – or 95.5% if they also faced withdrawal of council tax 
benefit. Most working adults in receipt of income support are subject to a 100% marginal 
tax rate, as every pound of private earnings above the small disregard is wholly offset by 
a one pound reduction in their income support entitlement. 
2.3.2  How do work incentives vary by family circumstances? 
Section 2.3.1 examined the distribution of work incentives across the working 
population; this section shows how incentives vary by family type.  
14 Table 2.4 shows the mean, median and quartile points of replacement rates, participation 
tax rates and effective marginal tax rates for people in six different family types:8
•  single adults without children9 
•  men and women (separately) in couples without children 
•  lone parents 
•  men and women (separately) in couples with children.10  
We use these same groups in the next chapter, when we show how work incentives have 
changed over time. 
The financial work incentives of these groups are very different. Lone parents face some 
of the weakest incentives to work at all, and face weak incentives to progress in the 
labour market. They face weak incentives to progress because many working lone parents 
will be subject to withdrawal of a tax credit or means-tested benefit as their earnings rise. 
For the same reason, and because of the low average wage that they receive and high 
levels of out-of-work income, they face weak incentives to work at all.  
Meanwhile, single adults without children face some of the strongest incentives. The 
relatively low level of state support that is provided to this group when that they are not 
working means that their replacement rates are generally low. The incentive to progress is 
relatively strong for this group, with most individuals being subject just to the basic rate 
of income tax and National Insurance contributions. The incentive to progress is weaker 
for high wage individuals who pay the higher rate of income tax, and also for very low-
earning individuals who may be receiving a  means-tested benefit or working tax credit. 
The table gives a mixed impression about the incentive to progress for people in couples. 
Looking at men in couples first, it can be seen that those who live in families with 
children have a weaker incentive to progress than those who do not. This is partly 
because men who live in couples with dependent children tend to be older, and so more 
likely to be subject to the higher-rate of income tax and therefore face a higher EMTR. 
Furthermore, men who live in couples with dependent children are much more likely to 
be subject to tax credit withdrawal. Men in couples with dependent children also face a 
weaker incentive to work at all (measured by both the replacement rate and the 
participation tax rate) than those without, because those with children would usually be 
entitled to tax credits even if no one in the family is working.  
 
                                                 
8 The median (50th centile) is the middle number, such that half of individuals have higher replacement rates (say) than 
this and half have lower. Similarly the first quartile (25th percentile) is the number that 25% of replacement rates are 
below, and the third quartile (75th centile) is the number that 75% of replacement rates are below 
9 “Children” means “dependent children”. 
10 For brevity, se sometimes refer to these as “fathers in couples” and “mothers in couples” respectively. 
15 Table 2.4. Financial work incentives of working adults in different family types, April 
2005 
  RR PTR  EMTR 
Single adults without children      
Mean 33.9  46.8  35.1 
Median 25.9  39.6  33.0 
25
th centile  18.7  35.8  31.4 
75
th centile  37.6  50.0  33.0 
Men in couples without children        
Mean 43.0  29.0  33.8 
Median 43.2  26.8  33.0 
25
th centile  33.8  23.9  31.4 
75
th centile  51.7  31.8  33.0 
Women in couples without 
children       
Mean 59.6  22.3  31.1 
Median 58.5  22.1  31.4 
25
th centile  50.0  17.0  31.4 
75
th centile  68.8  25.40  33.0 
Lone parents      
Mean  64.2 33.8  56.7 
Median  64.3 45.1  68.4 
25
th centile  50.2 21.8  33.0 
75
th centile  79.7 56.0  70.0 
Fathers in couples       
Mean  52.4 45.2  42.0 
Median  52.1 42.7  33.7 
25
th centile  41.2 34.4  31.4 
75
th centile  63.9 54.3  47.0 
Mothers in couples       
Mean  72.6 23.4  33.0 
Median  73.9 23.2  33.0 
25
th centile  62.9 13.0  31.4 
75
th centile  82.9 33.5  37.0 
All      
Mean  49.4 36.6  36.4 
Median  48.5 35.4  33.0 
25
th centile  29.5 25.5  31.4 
75
th centile  65.4  45.5  39.1 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving 
a disability benefit. Marginal effective tax rates calculated by increasing hours of work by 5%. RR = 
replacement rate. See section 2.4 for details. PTR = participation tax rate. EMTR = effective marginal tax 
rate.  
 
A similar pattern exists for women in couples: those in families with dependent children 
tend to face higher EMTRs and higher RRs than those in families with no dependent 
children. However, an important feature of the work incentives faced by women in 
couples is the different impressions given by the RR and the PTR: incentives to work at 
16 all appear quite weak when considering the replacement rate, but seem relatively strong 
when considering the participation tax rate. This is because women in couples are much 
more likely than men to have working (and high-earning) partners, and so the decision to 
work of a woman in a couple – especially if part-time or for a relatively low wage – may 
make little difference to family income, while these small additional earnings may be 
subject to little income tax or National Insurance contributions, and may make no 
difference to the family’s tax credit entitlement. 
Figures 2.2 to 2.4 provide a convenient way of summarising the distribution of work 
incentives. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of replacement rates within family types 
under the April 2005 tax and benefit system. The lines shown are the fraction of 
individuals (of that family type) with RRs equal to or lower than a given amount. Lines 
towards the top left of the picture correspond to groups with low RRs (strong 
incentives).  





































Single adult Lone parent
Man, couple no kids Woman, couple no kids
Man, couple with kids Woman, couple with kids
 
 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit.  See section 2.4 for details. 
Similarly, Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of participation tax rates. Some key findings 
are: 
•  Women in couples have some of the lowest participation tax rates. Almost 80% 
of women in couples without dependent children, and over 60% of those in 
couples with dependent children, have participation tax rates of 30% or below. In 
contrast, single adults and men in couples are especially unlikely to face very low 
participation tax rates. 
17 •  Across all groups, very few individuals face participation tax rates of 80% or 
above. The group most likely to have such rates however, is single adults, where 
they affect almost 4% of these individuals. 
•  The most common participation tax rate faced by lone parents is 50% to 60%. 
For other groups it is lower: for women in couples (both with and without 
children) and men in couples without children, the most common rate band is 
20% to 30%, for single adults it is 30% to 40%, and for men in couples with 
dependent children, it is 40% to 50%.  





































Single adult Lone parent
Man, couple no kids Woman, couple no kids
Man, couple with kids Woman, couple with kids
 
 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit.  See section 2.4 for details. 
Finally, we present the distribution of effective marginal tax rates within different family 
types in Figure 2.4. Some key findings are: 
•  The vast majority of mothers in couples, men and women in couples without 
children, and single adults without children face an EMTR between 30% and 
40%. A rate in this band is less common amongst men in couples with children,  
and relatively few lone parents face such rates. 
•  Almost 30% of men in couples with children and around 20% of men in couples 
without children face an EMTR between 40% and 50% (individuals in this range 
are mostly higher-rate income tax payers). For all other groups, the relevant 
proportion is under 10%, and is lowest for lone parents. 
18 •  The proportion of individuals facing low EMTRs (below 30%) is highest 
amongst women in couples.  
•  The proportion of individuals facing high EMTRs (above 50%) is highest 
amongst lone parents: over 60% of such individual are affected. 
Figure 2.4. Cumulative distribution of effective marginal tax rates within family 




































Single adult Lone parent
Man, couple no kids Woman, couple no kids
Man, couple with kids Woman, couple with kids
 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit. Marginal effective tax rates calculated by increasing hours of work by 5%.  See section 
2.4 for details. 
2.4  Detailed issues around measuring financial work incentives   
The following section discusses a number of detailed issues that need to be confronted 
when measuring financial work incentives using micro-simulation models.  
2.4.1  How do we define “net income”? 
All the measures discussed in this chapter relate to an individual’s income at various hour 
points. This prompts the obvious question of how one should actually measure income. 
For our analysis we consider all private sources of income in our definition, treating a 
pound of income the same regardless of whether it was obtained from earnings, 
investments, or any other source. To derive net income we then deduct income tax, 
employee National Insurance contributions (NICs) and council tax, and add income 
from state benefits and tax credits. We do not take account of indirect taxes. Nor do our 
measures of work incentives take account of taxes formally incident on employers, such 
as employer NICs; this could be done by adding employer NICs back into gross income. 
19 Non-take-up of benefits 
The example budget constraint shown in Figure 2.1a and the analysis in Section 2.4  were 
constructed assuming complete take-up of benefits and tax credits.  However, welfare 
programmes do exist where take-up is far from complete. Clearly, our assumption about 
take-up will have implications for our analysis, as it will determine the shape of the 
budget constraint and the derived work incentive measures: if we are incorrectly 
assuming that individuals are claiming and receiving benefits for which they are entitled, 
then we may be making incorrect inferences about the work incentives that they face. 11 
Despite this concern, we assume that there is full take-up of benefits and tax credits. 
While this assumption clearly is not ideal, given that we do not have complete data on 
benefit take-up over the past 25 years, it is perhaps the least arbitrary assumption that 
one can make. 
Childcare costs and the costs of working 
Our main analysis in section 2.4 ignored the fact that there are financial costs of working. 
Most individuals bear unavoidable various work-related costs, such as transportation 
costs and work clothing. Any measure of work incentives should ideally take these costs 
into consideration, and any analysis of the change in work incentives over time needs to 
factor in trends in these work-related costs: if income in work has been increasing over 
time, but the costs of working have been increasing more quickly, then it would be 
difficult to argue that work incentives have actually strengthened. However, most work 
costs are not recorded in household surveys, making it difficult to incorporate these 
work-related costs into our micro-simulation analysis. Also, even if we were to observe 
all work costs faced by those adults in work, the costs of working for someone who is not 
working (if they did work) may be different from the costs faced by someone who is 
actually working: this would have to be addressed using a technique similar to that used 
to solve the problem of the unknown wages for those not currently working (see later 
this section).  
An important work-related cost for parents is the need to arrange and possibly pay for 
someone else to look after their children while the parents work.  Unlike other work-
related costs, recent household surveys do record what parents spend on childcare. But 
there are still difficulties in using this data when calculating work incentives, beyond 
those already mentioned: 
•  Parents observed using childcare may be doing so for non-work-related reasons. 
If so, then it would be wrong to attribute the cost of childcare as a work-related  
cost. However, household survey data is rarely rich enough to discriminate 
between these different uses. 
•  The survey that we use for our comparisons of work incentives over three 
decades (the FES) does not have such rich data on childcare costs as other 
surveys that now exist. 
                                                 
11 It is not possible to say which way our results will be biased by assuming full take-up of means-tested benefits and 
tax credits: the direction of the bias depends on the detail of the particular means-tested benefit/tax credit. 
20 However, we show below what impact childcare costs can have upon work incentives 
estimated by a micro-simulation model. We predict childcare costs for those not working 
by estimating a relationship between spending on childcare and hours of work (using an 
Ordinary Least Squares regression, with no correction for “selection effects”), and we 
assume that all childcare costs recorded in the Family Resources Survey are work-related, 
so they would not be incurred were the adults not to work.  
Figure 2.5 shows the impact on the distribution of replacement rates for lone parents: 
deducting childcare costs from net incomes when women with dependent children work 
induces a rightward shift of the distribution, increasing the replacement rate (weakening 
work incentives) at the median by around 5 percentage points. A similar pattern is 
observed for adults in couples with dependent children: median replacement rates 
increase by 6 and 9 percentage points respectively. The percentage point impact is greater 
when we examine the participation tax rate: for lone parents,  women and men in couples 
with dependent children it increases at the median by 11, 18 and 18 percentage points 
respectively (full tables are available on request). 
Figure 2.5. The replacement rate distribution for working lone parents before and 









































Childcare Expenditure No Childcare Expenditure
 
  
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2002 tax and 
transfer system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit. Figure has been smoothed using kernel density techniques, so it shows the fraction of 
lone parents with RRs of a given value. 
Childcare costs (and other costs of work) clearly have a negative and important impact 
on work incentives. But while they appear important, our main analysis in chapter 3 will 
not take them into consideration when calculating work incentives, both for the reasons 
given above and also because we lack suitable data that covers our 25 year span.  
21 Housing costs 
In the Government’s Households Below Average Income (HBAI) publication, 
disposable income measures are presented on both a Before Housing Costs (BHC) and 
an After Housing Costs (AHC) basis. These two different income measures are generally 
seen as being complementary indicators of changes and differences in living standards 
over time: the reason for using these different income measures is discussed in Brewer et 
al (2005b). 
The housing services that individuals consume will (in the short run) not be affected by 
the choice of their hours of work. This means that reflecting housing costs in a budget 
constraint leads to a uniform downward shift in the budget constraint, with predictable 
effects on the work inventive measures: the participation tax rate and EMTR will remain 
unchanged, but replacement rates will fall. We do not deduct housing costs from our 
measure of net incomes in the main analysis in this paper, but Figure 2.6 shows this 
predictable shift in the distribution of replacement rates amongst all workers. 
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Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2002 tax and 
transfer system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit.  Figure has been smoothed using kernel density techniques. 
How should we measure income for individuals in couples? 
In this paper, we focus on the case where couples care about combined family income. 
This means that, when comparing the income in and out of work for an individual in a 
couple, we include in the calculations the net income of the partner. At the opposite 
extreme, an alternative which would lead to quite different measures of financial work 
incentives is to assume that couples don’t share income and don’t care about each other’s 
22 income, and therefore to ignore the income brought in by the partner: see Sutherland 
(1997), for example.  
2.4.2  What “margin” should be used when calculating effective marginal tax rates?  
In Figure 2.1b earlier, an example effective marginal tax rate schedule was shown. 
Amongst other things, it showed that the individual was subject to a 100% effective 
marginal tax rate over the range of incomes where they were in receipt of income 
support. For an individual who is located in such an income range, they have no financial 
incentive to increase their work effort by a very small amount. However, they do have an 
incentive to increase their work effort by a larger amount, as doing so can move the 
individual to a different section of the budget constraint so that they do indeed realise a 
financial gain. Clearly, our impression of the strength of work incentives depends upon 
the margin which is considered.  
In a simple economic model of labour supply, the strength of the work incentive 
depends, amongst other things, on the slope (or derivative) of the budget constraint. To 
calculate a EMTR that is as close as possible to the relevant concept in economic theory, 
one should choose a margin that is as small as possible, such as a change in gross 
earnings of 1 penny a week. However, such a measure can be criticised because, in 
practice, it is virtually impossible for individuals to vary their labour supply to the extent 
that their earnings change by 1p a week. In addition, rounding rules inherent in the 
calculation of taxes and benefit and tax credits sometimes mean that EMTRs calculated 
for a 1 penny change are atypical and uninformative about the slope evaluated over a 
slightly larger margin. 
For these reasons, the empirical analysis in this report calculates EMTRs by increasing 
weekly hours by 5% (approximately an hour a week for someone working part-time, and 
2 hours a week for someone working full-time). EMTRs estimated in this way will be 
identical to those calculated by increasing the hourly wage by 5% except where there are 
hours rules in the means-tested benefits and tax credit system. 12 If a change in income 
arises from a change in hours worked rather than in wages, the changed hours might take 
the invididual across (say) the 16-hours threshold above which they lose entitlement to 
income support, or the 30-hours threshold above which they are entitled to additional 
working tax credit. 
For individuals who face the same EMTR over a reasonably long range of income, then 
the choice of margin is unlikely to influence our impression of incentives to progress. But 
for individuals whose earnings place them close to kink points or discontinuities in the 
budget constraint, then the choice of margin is likely to be very important. In Table 2.5 
we show how the distribution of marginal tax rates varies when increasing hours of work 
by 5%, 10% and 20%: we infer from this that there is very little change in EMTRs across 
                                                 
12 In early work for this project, we examined data on changes in hours worked over a 12 month period (using the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey, which follows the same individuals over a five quarter period): this revealed that many 
individuals do report small changes in hours. We had hoped to use such analysis to inform our judgement of what 
margin to choose, but we felt that the estimates from the QLFS were too unreliable, and so we arbitrarily chose a 5% 
change in hours worked. 
23 much of the distribution, even for lone parents, whose budget constraints have many 
kink points.  
Table 2.5. How mean EMTRs vary with the “margin” 
Change in hours worked   
5% 10%  20% 
Single adults without children      
Mean 36%  36%  35% 
Median 33%  33%  33% 
25
th centile  33%  33%  32% 
75
th centile  36%  36%  36% 
Men in couples without children        
Mean 35%  36%  36% 
Median 34%  34%  34% 
25
th centile  33%  33%  33% 
75
th centile  38%  38%  39% 
Women in couples without 
children       
Mean 33%  33%  33% 
Median 33%  33%  33% 
25
th centile  32%  32%  32% 
75
th centile  36%  36%  36% 
Lone parents      
Mean  57% 55%  54% 
Median  68% 68%  65% 
25
th centile  36% 36%  34% 
75
th centile  71% 71%  71% 
Fathers in couples       
Mean  43% 43%  42% 
Median  38% 39%  39% 
25
th centile  33% 33%  33% 
75
th centile  46% 46%  45% 
Mothers in couples       
Mean  35% 35%  35% 
Median  34% 35%  35% 
25
th centile  31% 31%  32% 
75
th centile  39% 39%  39% 
 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit. 
2.4.3  What time period should be considered when measuring incomes?  
All discussion of work incentives to this point has made no consideration of how work 
incentives might change over time because of time dependencies in the tax and benefit 
system. But such time dependencies can be very important. For example: 
•  Contributions-based Jobseekers Allowance is paid for only six months, so 
individuals whose family circumstances disqualify them from receiving income-
24 based Jobseekers Allowance will see their out-of-work income fall (and their 
incentive to work at all strengthen) after 6 months. 
•  Mortgage interest payments under Income Support or income-based Jobseekers 
Allowance (ISMI) are payable (to non-pensioners) only after a claim has exceeded 
9 months, meaning that out-of-work income will rise (and the incentive to work 
at all weaken) for such families after 9 months. 
•  Certain means-tested benefits have “run-ons”, where part or all of the benefit 
continues to be paid for a short-time after a claimant moves into work. This 
means that income when working is higher (and therefore the incentive to work 
at all is stronger) in the first few weeks of moving into work than it is 
subsequently. 
•  There is a £25,000 disregard applied to rises in income when calculating 
entitlements to the child and working tax credits. 13 This means that someone 
whose income rises will receive more tax credits in that financial year than they 
will in future years (and therefore the incentive to work at all is initially stronger), 
even if their income remains unchanged thereafter. 
The main analysis in this paper is based on a long-run measure of work incentives, where 
we ignore the income disregard in tax credits, we assume that no-one is entitled to 
contributions-based JSA, and we allow home-owners to receive ISMI if they are entitled 
to Income Support or income-based Jobseekers Allowance. 
In Table 2.6, though, we give some examples of how the choice of time period affects 
our impression of work incentives. We compare the median replacement rate and 
participation tax rate for non-workers calculated using the long-run measure used 
throughout this report (in which families entitled to income support are entitled to 
ISMI), but also for a short-run measure, where we recognise entitlement to contributory-
based JSA, and we implement the income disregard in the new tax credits (note that 
these have offsetting impacts on the incentive to work).14 Another alternative would of 
course be to construct some measure of work incentives that lay in between the short- 
and long-run estimates, based on some choice of discount rate: we do not pursue this 
here, though. 
                                                 
13 Entitlements to tax credits in the current financial year depend on the greater of (annual income in the current year – 
£25,000) and (annual income in the previous year).  
14 The analysis in this Table was calculated when the disregard was £2,500, rather than its present £25,000. We use 
non-workers here because we want to observe whether individuals are entitled to contributory JSA; the way we 
calculate work incentives for non-workers is discussed in the following section. 
25 Table 2.6. The estimated short-run and long-run incentive to work at all for non-
workers, 2005–06 
Replacement rate  Participation tax rate   
20 hours  40 hours  20 hours  40 hours 
Single adults without children       
Short  run  57 36 50 39 
Long  run  56 35 49 39 
Men in couples without children          
Short  run  71 52 39 36 
Long  run  70 51 38 37 
Women in couples without 
children    
   
Short  run  75 59 24 28 
Long  run  75 60 24 28 
Lone parents       
Short  run  77 64 48 51 
Long  run  79 68 51 57 
Fathers in couples        
Short  run  75 64 43 47 
Long  run  79 65 51 50 
Mothers in couples        
Short  run  79 70 18 28 
Long  run  82 71 26 31 
 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit. Wages for non-workers have been generated using Heckman selectivity adjustments – 
see Section 2.4.4. 
For adults without children, the long-run and short-run incentives are very similar: as 
expected, short-run incentives to work tend to be slightly weaker than long-run 
incentives, because of entitlement to contributions-based JSA. For adults in families with 
dependent children, though, the reverse is true: short-run incentives to work are stronger 
than long-run incentives, because the strengthening of work incentives from the 
temporary earnings disregard in tax credits outweighs the weakening of incentives from 
contributions-based JSA (it is also the case that few non-working parents are receiving 
contributions-based JSA).  
The impact is particularly noticeable for women in couples with dependent children, 
where the disregard reduces the median participation tax rate for part-time work by over 
a third. This is because these women, when working part-time, will tend to pay little 
income tax or national insurance, and the most important wedge between gross and net 
earnings will be the withdrawal of tax credits; consequently, the temporary earnings 
disregard makes a large difference. 
2.4.4  How should we estimate work incentives for those not working?  
All the work incentive measures discussed require us to specify the individual’s wage. If 
we limit our analysis to those individuals who are working, then this presents no 
26 problems, as we can use the wage reported in the household survey data. For non-
working individuals this is clearly not possible. 
Economists have devised a number of methods to overcome the problem of the lack of 
wage information for non-workers. The simplest way of generating wages is to estimate a 
wage equation based on those individuals whom we observe working and then use this 
equation we to predict wages for non-workers on the basis of their characteristics. The 
problem with this approach, however, is that the decision to work is not a random one: 
workers form a self-selecting group, and, if the decision to work is influenced by financial 
considerations, then, other things equal, individuals with a low return to work will be less 
likely to work.  
This means that, if there are factors unobserved by the analyst that affects the wage 
someone could earn, then the actual wage that would be earned by someone not 
currently working should be lower than that of someone observed in work with the same 
observable characteristics. This problem is known as the “selection problem”. 
Econometricians have developed procedures to overcome this problem of selectivity 
(Heckman 1974, 1979): they generally involve specifying the relationship determining 
both an individual’s wage rate and their decision to work. 
As an alternative to making such selectivity adjustments, Gregg et al (1999) assume that 
individuals currently not in work would be able to earn hourly wages similar to those of 
individuals who had recently entered work, and who had similar observable 
characteristics. Gregg et al show that average entry wages are lower than average wages 
(across all workers) even after accounting for selectivity.15  
The data sets that we use – the Family Resources Survey and the Family Expenditure 
Survey – do not contain sufficient information to estimate entry wages, so we cannot 
pursue that approach. Instead, Table 2.7 shows how some work incentive measures vary 
across workers and non-workers, where wages for non-workers have been calculated 
using Heckman-style selectivity adjustments. 16  
                                                 
15 Of course, in principle we could estimate selectivity adjusted entry wages which may be expected to produce even 
lower predicted wage rates. 
16 No attempt is made to predict hours of work for non-workers. 
27 Table 2.7. Workers and Non-workers: Comparing median replacement rates and 
participation tax rates, April 2005 tax and benefit system 
Replacement rate  Participation tax rate   
20 hours  40 hours  20 hours  40 hours 
Single adults without children       
Working  45 25 51 41 
Not  working  56 35 49 39 
Men in couples without children          
Working  60 44 25 30 
Not  working  70 51 38 37 
Women in couples without 
children    
   
Working  70 56 17 25 
Not  working  75 60 24 28 
Lone parents       
Working  72 58 46 51 
Not  working  79 68 51 57 
Fathers in couples        
Working  72 54 48 45 
Not  working  79 65 51 50 
Mothers in couples        
Working  78 65 72 29 
Not  working  82 71 26 31 
Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using FRS 2002–03 and TAXBEN under April 2005 tax and 
benefit system. Excludes families containing any adults aged over 55, self-employed, or receiving a 
disability benefit. Wages for non-workers have been generated using Heckman selectivity adjustments. 
 
A very clear pattern exists when comparing non-workers to workers: non-workers have 
higher replacement rates and, with the exception of single adults without children and 
women in couples with dependent children, higher participation tax rates.  
The incentive to work at all is weaker for those currently not working, mostly because we 
estimate that they would earn lower hourly wages than those currently in work. But the 
lower hourly wage does not entirely explain the difference: the rest must be due to 
differences in characteristics that are affecting the work incentives inherent in the tax and 
benefit system (for example, non-working families are more likely to have three or more 
children, and the incentive to work for an adult in a family with three or more children is 
weaker than that faced by an adult in a family with 1 child).  
The rest of this report, though, focuses on the work incentives faced by workers, mostly 
because we are not sure that the potential wages we estimate for non-workers are 
accurate or reliable, a problem which becomes more acute when we attempt to analyse 
trends since the 1970s. 
 
28 3.  Work incentives over time 
Section 2.4 looked at the distribution of financial work incentives in 2005-06 and 
examined which sorts of people face the strongest and weakest incentives to work at all 
and to progress. This chapter examines how these incentives have changed since 1979. It 
looks at changes in both the incentive to work at all, captured by the participation tax 
rate and the replacement rate, and the incentive to progress in the labour market, as 
captured by the EMTR.   
As well as showing the main trends, we also explain what has caused these changes. First, 
we show how the changes are split between high-level demographic groups (defined by 
whether they live with a partner, whether they have children, and, for those people who 
live with a partner, by gender). Second, we show how much of the changes can be 
explained by various factors, such as changes to the tax and benefit system, changes in 
the real level of wages and their distribution, and changes to the real level of rents; the 
precise methodology is explained in Box 3.1.  
We focus on the work incentives faced by workers. We use data from the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) for the years 1979 to 1993, and the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS) thereafter.17  
3.1  What has happened to financial work incentives on average? 
 
Understanding the Figures in this chapter.  
Many figures in chapter 3 show five series over time: the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
centiles of the distribution of work incentives within a particular group of the population. 
The 10th and 25th centiles illustrate the financial work incentives of people with relatively 
strong financial work incentives, and the 75th and 90th centiles illustrate the incentives of 
people with relatively weak financial work incentives. 
Years on the horizontal axis of the Figures refer to calendar years until 1993, and then 
financial years.  
We usually measure incentives to work at all at a fixed number of hours a week (either 20 
or 40) in order that changes over time in weekly hours worked do not affect our results. 
EMTRs have been calculated by increasing observed hours worked by 5% (so around 1 
hour a week for a part-time worker, and 2 hours a week for a full-time worker). 
 
 
                                                 
17 The FES records cohabiting couples as being single individuals before 1990. We therefore impute cohabitation 
status for these years. The movement from imputed to actual cohabitation status in 1990 may help explain the slight 
discontinuity that is seen in some of our aggregate series.  At the time this analysis was undertaken, the latest data was 
FRS 2002/3, and analysis for later years was based on uprated 2002/3 data. 
29 The incentive to work at all 
The financial incentive to work at all, as captured by both the participation tax rate and 
the replacement rate, has generally strengthened (ie the rates have fallen) between 1979 
and 2005. Figure 3.1 shows what has happened to replacement rates, and Figure 3.2 
shows the same for participation tax rates amongst all working individuals, evaluated at 
their usual hours of work (Box 3.1 gives more detail on the methodology used to 
construct that Figure and others in this chapter). 
The changes have not been even, though, across the period. Replacement rates rose in 
the early 1980s, before falling over the rest of the decade (recall that replacement rates 
fall when financial work incentives strengthen). The turn of the 1990s saw the incentive 
to work at all weaken briefly, before a long period through the 1990s of relatively small 
changes, with mostly strengthening incentives. Work incentives in 2005 are slightly 
stronger than they were in 1997.  
The changes in replacement rates have been uneven across the distribution: there has 
been a tendency for the distribution of replacement rates at a point in time to become 
more dispersed: the 90:10 ratio has grown from 3.2 to 4.3 over the period. The increased 
dispersion has arisen because the weakest incentives to work at all have not changed, or 
have weakened, over time, but the strongest incentives to work have become stronger.  
The median participation tax rate has generally shown the same trend as the median 
replacement rate, and shows more pronounced changes. Changes across the distribution 
are rather different, with the participation tax rate showing reduced (rather than 
increased) dispersion over time. This difference is not enormously meaningful in itself: 
PTRs and RRs are constructed in different ways, and there is no reason to expect their 
variances to be related. But it suggests that whether the weakest incentives have 
strengthened relative to the strongest incentives is ambiguous, depending on which 
measure of incentives is used. 
It is worth repeating the key conclusions because they will be echoed when we examine 
the changes amongst different sub-groups. In particular, incentives to work at all 
generally: 
•  are stronger in 2005 than in 1979, on average  
•  weakened in the early 1980s, at the turn of the 1990s, and in the early 2000s 
•  weakened over most of the 1980s and over most of the 1990s 
•  got more dispersed over time when measured by the replacement rate, but less 
dispersed when measured by the participation tax rate. 
 




























































































Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes 
families containing any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit.. 
Replacement rates evaluated at usual hours worked. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 




























































































Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes 
families containing any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
Replacement rates evaluated at usual hours worked. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
31 So what has caused these changes? Changes in average financial work incentives are 
caused not just by changes in the tax and benefit system but also by changes in wages, 
rents, the demographic make-up of the population, and so on. Decomposition analysis 
seeks to isolate the contributions of various factors to the changes over time. The results 
of a decomposition analysis on median replacement rate are shown in Figure 3.3: each 
line in the figure shows the effect on the median replacement rate of changes in a 
particular factor, conditional on the preceding changes (see Box 3.2 for the precise 
details; the replacement rates have been calculated for full-time work).  
The first stage of the decomposition identifies the effect of changes in level and 
distribution of wages. For each year, the line marked “Wages” shows us how the median 
replacement rate would have changed from its 1979 value if the 1979 population had all 
experienced the sort of wage changes that actually occurred and nothing else had 
changed: the Figure shows us, unsurprisingly, that these changes in real wages alone 
substantially reduced replacement rates: wage growth increased in-work incomes while 
leaving out-of-work incomes unaffected.  
Figure 3.3. Understanding changes in the median replacement rate among the 























































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit.  Replacement rates 
evaluated at 40 hours a week. 
The remaining three stages of the decomposition show us the incremental impact of four 
other changes: 
•  The line marked Rents shows the impact of real rent changes on the incentive to 
work at all. The mechanism is Housing Benefit: higher rents will generally lead to 
32 higher entitlements to Housing Benefit, which increases out-of-work income and 
increases in-work income by the same or a smaller amount. The Figure confirms 
that real rent changes weakened the incentive to work at all.  
•  The line marked Tax shows the impact of real tax and benefit changes. It shows 
that the tax and benefit systems between 1980 and 1989 led to weaker incentives 
to work than in 1979, because the line marked “Tax” is above the zero line, but 
that those after 1989 would have led to stronger incentives to work compared 
with 1979).  It also shows that the impact of real tax and benefit changes since 
1999 has been to weaken the median incentive to work. 
•  Lastly, the residual shows the incremental changes caused by all other changes 
(see Box 3.2 for what this might include).  
It is important to recognise that decompositions have limitations. They aim to isolate the 
effect of policy changes (for example) by showing what work incentives would have 
looked like in the absence of policy changes, holding all other factors constant. But 
“holding other factors constant” is problematic in two respects: 
•  in practice people may well have behaved differently, changing these “other 
factors”, if different policies had been in place. So this decomposition approach 
can only identify the direct effect of policy: it cannot tell us, for example, how far 
tax and benefit reforms changed work incentives by affecting the wages offered 
by employers. 
•  the decomposition treats changes sequentially, whereas they actually occurred 
simultaneously. Thus the estimated impacts from the decomposition analysis are 
order-dependent: each stage identifies the additional effect of a particular change, 
conditional on the preceding changes, so the effect of each factor might vary 
according to whether other factors are held constant at their 1979 or 2000 levels.  
As Box 3.2 makes clear, the results from this sort of analysis are order-dependent: each 
stage identifies the additional effect of a particular change, conditional on the preceding 
changes. In work not shown here we performed the decompositions in a different 
order.18 Reassuringly, the results are not quantitatively identical, but are qualitatively 
similar: 
•  real wage changes have always strengthened the incentive to work at all. 
•  The tax and benefit systems in operation between 1980 and 1989 all led to 
weaker incentives to work at all than that of 1979; those since 1989 led to 
stronger incentives. Real tax and benefit changes since 1999, though, have been 
weakening the incentive to work at all. 
•  increased real rents and all other changes have all weakened the incentive to 
work.   
                                                 
18 The order of the alternative decomposition was: real tax and benefit changes, average wage growth, wage inequality, 
real rent changes, all other changes. 
33 Results for all of the decomposition shown in this paper are available performed in this 
other order, and we report them here only when they are of interest. Generally, the order 
of the decomposition can matter, particularly in the most recent years, when deciding 
how much of the observed change in financial incentives is due to changes in wages, and 
how much is due to changes in the tax and benefit system. For example, whether the tax 
and benefit system in 2005–06 leads to stronger or weaker incentives to progress (on 
average) than the one in 1979 depends on whether we calculate incentives in 2005–06 
using the real wages observed in 1979 or in 2005–06.  
 
34 Box 3.2. Understanding the changes in financial work incentives though a 
decomposition analysis 
The main technique used in our work to understand the changes in financial work 
incentives is to decompose the observed changes into those caused by changes to the tax 
and benefit system, and those due to changes in the characteristics of the working 
population. 
To do this, we start with the population observed in 1979 facing the tax and benefit 
system of 1979. We then change economic variables and characteristics of this 
population until we end up with the actual population in a different year (say 2000), with 
the actual tax and benefit system of 2000. 19 The stages in the decomposition are 
described below, assuming for simplicity that we are only comparing 1979 and 2000 (in 
reality we do this for every year): 
1.  Identify the contribution of changes in the level and distribution of wages, by 
assuming that the population in 2000 has the same real characteristics as in 1979 
except for wages, which follow the distribution of the 2000 population. We do 
this by projecting the actual wage distribution in 2000 onto the 1979 population, 
so that each 1979 individual is assigned the wage of someone observed in 2000 
with the same wage ranking within the relevant demographic group. Comparing 
the work incentives of this wage-adjusted 1979 population with those of the 
actual 1979 population, both under the 1979 tax and benefit system, shows the 
impact of wage changes alone on work incentives.  
2.  Identify the additional contribution of real changes in average rents (but still 
assuming that the proportion of the group in rented accommodation is the same 
as 1979) by increasing all rents by the growth in average rents between 1979 and 
2000. 
3.  Identify the additional contribution of real changes to the tax and benefit system 
by allowing the tax and benefit system to change. 20 
4.  Identify the additional contribution of all other changes that might affect 
financial work incentives, such as changes in non-earned income, housing tenure, 
disability and ill health, and, amongst parents, the number and age of dependent 
children. This also includes changes in the working patterns amongst couples: as 
shown in chapter 2, this will be an important factor in explaining financial work 
incentives amongst individuals in couples. 
 
                                                 
19 Similar analyses have been undertaken by, for example, Adam and Brewer (2004) to explain changes in child-
contingent support, and Dickens and Ellwood (2004) to explain changes in child poverty in the US and UK. 
20 When looking at changes over this long period (25 years), it is arguably more sensible to assume that the appropriate 
index for uprating tax and benefit parameters over time should be the growth in average earnings rather than the 
growth in average retail prices (see Clark and Leicester (2004), Evans and Eyre (2004)). However, we have decided to 
assume that “no real changes” is the baseline, but to show the impact of real changes in the tax and benefit system 
separately from the impact of real changes in wages. 
35  
Later sections in this chapter give more detail of how financial work incentives have 
changed for particular groups.  
The incentive to progress 
Trends in the financial incentive to progress – as measured by EMTRs – are shown in 
Figure 3.4. 
The economy-wide median incentive shows a similar pattern to the incentive to work at 
all. It weakened in the early 1980s, and strengthened rapidly between 1985 and 1988. 
Between 1988 and 1995, it weakened slightly, then strengthened between 1995 and 1997, 
since when it has been weakening once more. 
However, the trend shown by the other lines on the Figure is rather different from the 
median. The distribution of incentives to progress has become much more dispersed 
over time: in 1979, 80% of the population faced EMTRs of between 29% and 37%; in 
2004–05, the range is between 23% and 68%. 21  This increased dispersion is less evident 
when examining the inter-quartile range (the 25th and 75th centiles): it is due to changes 
for those with the strongest and weakest incentives. In particular, the strongest incentives 
to progress (measured by the 10th centile) have strengthened by more than the median, 
particularly between 1995 and 2000, when tax rates for low earners were being cut, and 
the weakest incentives to progress (measured by the 90th centile) have got a lot weaker 
since 1999, as eligibility for in-work support extended both up the income distribution 
and (in 2003) to people without children.    
Figure 3.4 also shows us that, Since 2003, more than one in four workers have faced an 
effective marginal tax rate of around 40 per cent or more, the first time this has 
happened since 1985. This reflects both the impact of fiscal drag on the number of 
higher-rate taxpayers and the increasing numbers of workers entitled to in-work 
support.22
                                                 
21 This is taking the 80% of the population who are not at the extremes of the distribution: those lying between the 
10th and 90th centiles.  
22 People rich enough to pay higher-rate tax but who are contracted out of the state second pension would face an 
EMTR of 39.4% after April 2003 (we ignore the additional age-related NICs rebate that applies to people who are 
contracted out into defined contribution pension schemes).  

































































































Notes and sources: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes 
families containing any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
Replacement rates evaluated at usual hours worked. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
Changes in the median incentive to progress are overwhelmingly determined by changes 
to the tax and benefit system: the decline in the median EMTR during the mid 1990s 
reflects the successive cuts in the basic rate of income tax, for example. For this reason, 
we instead show a decomposition of changes in the mean EMTR in Figure 3.5. The key 
results are:  
•  real tax and benefit changes are the single most important determinant of 
changes in the average incentive to progress.  
•  The tax and benefit systems between 1980 and 1987 produced weaker incentives 
to progress, on average, than that of 1979; those more recent than 1988 have 
produced stronger incentives to progress, on average. But the impact of recent 
tax and benefit changes (since 1999) has been to weaken, on average, incentives 
to progress, raising the average EMTR by almost 3 percentage points.23 
                                                 
23 Whether the tax and benefit system in 2005–06 leads to stronger or weaker incentives to progress (on average) than 
the one in 1979 depends on whether we calculate incentives in 2005–06 using the real earnings observed in 1979 or in 
2005/06. In work not shown here, we find that if real wages had not changed since 1979, then real tax and benefit 
reforms between 1979 and 2005 would have reduced average incentives to progress, because of the increased support 
for low-income working families, and the consequential increased likelihood that workers would face a withdrawal of 
income-related support as their earning rise. However, once we allow for real wages to grow, then real tax and benefit 
reforms between 1979 and 2005 have strengthened average incentives to progress. 
37 •  Over the whole period, changes in wages had very little net effect on the average 
incentive to progress, only slightly weakening it overall: in the first third of the 
period, these changes lowered the mean EMTR, but since the late 1980s they 
have raised it. Growth in real wages will strengthen incentives to progress for 
adults who become too rich to quality for means-tested benefits or tax credits, or 
too rich to pay National Insurance contributions on their extra earnings, but 
weaken them for those who move onto higher income tax rates; our analysis 
suggests, therefore, that the latter effect slightly outweighs the former over this 
whole period.  
•  Changes in the real level of rents, and all other changes not explicitly mentioned 
here, have both tended to weaken incentives to progress, on average. 












































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
Summary: 
Both incentives to work at all, and incentives to progress, are generally stronger 
now than in 1979.  
Real wage growth has greatly strengthened the incentive to work at all (measured 
by replacement rates), because out-of-work benefits have typically been increased 
only in line with price inflation, not average wage growth.   
Over the whole period, changes in wages had very little effect on the average 
incentive to progress. Wage growth reduces EMTRs for those adults who become 
too rich to quality for means-tested benefits or tax credits, or too rich to pay 
38 National Insurance contributions on their extra earnings, but it increases EMTRs 
for those who move onto higher income tax rates; our analysis suggests that these 
effects broadly offset each other, with the latter effect only slightly outweighing 
the former over this whole period. 
The cumulative effect of 26 years of real tax and benefit changes has been to 
strengthen work incentives. The pattern has not been even, though: between 1979 
and 1983, real tax and benefit changes tended to weaken the incentive to work; 
between 1983 and the late 1990s, they tended to strengthen it; and the most recent 
changes have tended to weaken it once more. Since 1999, tax and benefit changes 
have increased the average EMTR by almost three percentage points. 
Increased real rents and all other changes have all weakened the incentive to work 
and incentives to progress. 
3.2  How have financial work incentives changed for different groups in the 
population? 
In the next section, we show how financial work incentives have changed for people in 
six different demographic groups, defined by whether they live with a partner, whether 
they have children, and, for those people who live with a partner, their gender. Since 
1979, the relative size of these six groups has changed considerably. In work not shown 
here, we find that these changes hardly contribute to the trends shown in the earlier 
figures: instead, it is the changing financial work incentives within the six groups that 
have driven the changes, and so we focus on those changes below.  
In each of the next sections, we echo the analysis in section 3.1: we show how the 
incentives to work at all and the incentives to progress have changed, and we undertake a 
decomposition analysis to try to understand what has been causing the changes. 24
Lone parents: incentive to work at all 
As we saw in Chapter 2, lone parents face the weakest financial work incentives of our 
demographic groups. 
The financial incentive for lone parents to work part-time (20 hours a week) is now 
stronger than it was in 1979, in general, as measured by replacement rates (see Figure 
3.6). An important cause of the fall in three of the series shown in Figure 3.6 was the 
reform to family credit in 1992, when the number of hours needed to receive in-work 
benefits fell from 24 to 16. But there has also been a noticeable weakening of work 
incentives in recent years, at the same time as lone parents’ entitlements to out-of-work 
benefits have been rising. As for the population as a whole, replacement rates have 
become more dispersed over time; unlike for the population as a whole, though, the 
weakest incentives to work at all (the 90th centile) have been getting stronger, albeit by 
less than the strongest (the 10th centile).  
                                                 
24 When calculating replacement rates, we hold hours of work constant over time at 40 hours a week for all groups 
except lone parents, where we calculate incentives to work at all at 20 hours a week. 
39 Our other measure of the incentive to work at all – the participation tax rate – shows 
broadly similar trends (Figure 3.7): 
•  incentives to work at all are stronger now than in 1979, with big one-off 
strengthenings in 1992 and 1999 
•  the distribution is more dispersed.  
However, the PTR shows further strengthening of the incentive to work since 1999, in 
contrast to the RR. Indeed, the PTR shows that, since 2000, between 10 and 25 per cent 
of working lone parents find that their net income rises by more than their gross earnings 
when they move into work (this is the implication of a negative PTR, and it can happen if 
in-work support (less taxes) is greater than out-of-work support).  
 
40 Figure 3.6. Changes in the part-time replacement rate amongst working lone 
























































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Replacement rates 
evaluated at 20 hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
centiles of the distribution. 
Figure 3.7. Changes in the part-time PTR rate amongst working lone parents, 






























































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Replacement rates 
evaluated at 20 hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
centiles of the distribution. 
41 Incentives to work full-time – not shown here – have always been stronger than those to 
work part-time, but have strengthened by less over this period. Non-workers – again, not 
shown here –  have experienced similar changes in their work incentives over this same 
period, although, as we said in Chapter 2, their incentives are slightly weaker, in general, 
than those already in work.  
The results of a decomposition analysis on the changes in the median replacement rate 
for part-time work amongst working lone parents is shown in Figure 3.8 (see Box 3.2 for 
the precise details). It tells us the following:  
•  There were only small changes to the median replacement rate between 1979 and 
1991, with average wage growth tending to strengthen the incentive to work at 
all, but other changes weakening it 
•  Since 1991, real changes to the tax and benefit system have dramatically 
strengthened the incentive to work at all 
•  Changes in wages earned by lone parents has meant that incentives to work at all 
are stronger than they were in 1979 
•  Changes to rent levels, and all other changes, though, have weakened the median 
incentive to work at all.  
According to the decomposition analysis in Figure 3.8, the weakening between 2000 and 
2003 of lone parents’ incentives to work at all was not primarily due to changes in taxes 
and benefits: instead, the analysis suggests that it was due to the low growth in lone 
parents’ wages, the growth in rents, and all other changes (such as changes in lone 
parents’ family compositions) since 1999.  
42 Figure 3.8. Understanding changes in the median part-time replacement rate 
































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Replacement rates 
evaluated at 20 hours. 
Lone parents: incentive to progress 
Changes in lone parents’ incentives to progress in the labour market are shown in Figure 
3.9. It shows that: 
•  the weakest incentives to progress have strengthened since the early 1980s: since 
1999, 75 per cent of working lone parents have had an EMTR below 70%, the 
highest proportion since 1982. In 1999, the proportion of working lone parents 
with EMTRs of 100% or more fell below 10% for the first time in our data. 
•  The strongest incentives to progress have hardly changed (25th centile) or have 
slightly strengthened (10th centile) since 1979. This group represents lone parents 
who are unaffected by withdrawal rates in means-tested benefits or in-work 
support, either because they don’t have low enough incomes to be entitled or 
because they earn so little that extra earnings do not reduce entitlements.  
•  The median incentive to progress, though, has weakened over time, with the 
median EMTR jumping from around 40% to around 70% as entitlement to in-
work support has grown amongst working lone parents.  
































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 
As with  the population as a whole, changes in the median EMTR track changes in the 
tax and benefit system. The results of a decomposition analysis of the mean incentive to 
progress are shown in Figure 3.10.  As with other Figures showing changes in lone 
parents’ work incentives, some of the individual series (particularly the “residual”, or the 
impact of all changes not explicitly accounted for) are rather volatile. The key results are 
the following:  
•  real tax and benefit changes have weakened incentives to progress from their 
1979 level particularly because of reforms in the early 1990s.  
•  Changes in the wages received by lone parents strengthened their incentives to 
progress, particularly after 1988, presumably by making fewer of them eligible to 
means-tested benefits or tax credits.  
•  Changes in the real level of rents have weakened incentives to progress, by 
extending the range of earnings consistent with eligibility to housing benefit.  



































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
 
Summary:  
The incentive for lone parents to work part-time (compared to not working) is 
generally stronger now than in 1979, both because real wages have risen and 
because in-work support is now available for part-time as well as full-time 
workers. On the other hand, real rent rises and housing benefit have weakened 
the incentive for lone parents to work, and incentives to work in 2005 are slightly 
weaker than they were in 1999. 
Until the early 1990s, the extension of in-work support amongst lone parents was 
broadly in line with the real changes in lone parents’ wages, and so incentives to 
progress were broadly unchanged from their 1979 level. Reforms to family credit 
in the early 1990s, though, extended in-work support to many more lone parents, 
weakening incentives to progress, on average, for those already in work. In more 
recent years, the expansion of tax credits has increased EMTRs for relatively well-
off lone parents previously facing strong incentives to progress, but strengthened 
some of the weakest incentives to progress. But it is still the case in 2005–06 that 
more than half of working lone parents would, once the temporary disregard in 
tax credits had expired, keep less than a third of any extra earnings if they worked 
an hour or two more each week. 
45 Couples with children: incentive to work at all 
The incentive for men in couples with children to work full-time generally weakened in 
the early 1980s, strengthened slowly from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, but has begun 
to weaken since then (see Figures 3.11 and 3.12). 
As in the whole population, there has been a slight increase over time in the dispersion of 
RRs, but a reduction in the dispersion of PTRs. Comparing 1979 and 2005, there has 
been little change in the highest RRs, but a reduction in the lowest; there has been little 
change in the lowest PTRs, but a reduction in the highest. This is the only demographic 
group for whom the dispersion of PTRs has narrowed. 
Figure 3.11. Changes in the full-time replacement rate amongst working fathers in 

























































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Replacement rates 
evaluated at 40 hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
centiles of the distribution. 
 
46 Figure 3.12. Changes in the full-time PTR amongst working fathers in couples, 
































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
Financial incentives to work at all tend to be weaker amongst working mothers in 
couples than fathers in couples, and the distribution is much less dispersed (Figures 3.13 
and 3.14). For the majority of women in couples, the trends are broadly similar to those 
amongst fathers in couples – a gradual strengthening from the early 1980s to the late 
1990s, with spells of weakening incentives before and after this period. Unlike for men, 
though, the weakest incentives faced by women became weaker even between the early 
1980s and the late 1990s. As for men, there has been an increase in the dispersion of 
RRs; but unlike for men, the dispersion of PTRs has also increased. 
The part-time replacement rate amongst working mothers in couples tends to be higher 
than the full-time replacement rate, but the trend over this period is extremely similar 
(not shown). 
47 Figure 3.13. Changes in the full-time replacement rate amongst working mothers 























































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
 
48 Figure 3.14. Changes in the full-time PTR amongst working mothers in couples, 































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
 
Decomposing the changes in the median full-time RR for fathers in couples suggests the 
following (see Figure 3.15):  
•  Real tax and benefit changes have tended to weaken the incentive to work at all, 
with particularly marked deteriorations in the early 1980s and since the late 1990s.  
•  Changes in the wages earned by men in couples with children has more than 
offset this, though, substantially strengthening the incentive to work at all.  
•  Real growth in rents has slightly increased the median replacement rate.  
Although the changes are much less pronounced, the same decomposition for women in 
couples with dependent children (Figure 3.16) tells the same story: real tax and benefit 
changes alone would have weakened the median incentive to work at all, but changes in 
the wages received by these women have more than offset this. 
 
49 Figure 3.15 Understanding changes in the median full-time replacement rate 





































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours.  
 
Figure 3.16 Understanding changes in the median full-time replacement rate 





































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 




50 Couples with children: incentive to progress 
Trends in the incentives to progress facing working fathers in couples are shown in 
Figure 3.17. Between 1979 and 1999, the trends are very similar across the distribution of 
working fathers, and very similar to those of the general population. Incentives to 
progress have been weakening since 1999 at most points in the distribution; the marked 
jump in the 90th centile shows us that, after WFTC was introduced, more than 10 per 
cent of working fathers were in families receiving in-work support. 
The trend in the median EMTR for working mothers in couples (Figure 3.18) is very 
similar to that for working fathers. The other lines, though, look quite different. This is 
partly because, over much of our period, a significant minority of working mothers faced 
either zero, or a very low, EMTR. Typically, these are women with income below the 
personal allowance and so not paying income tax, but whose partners have a high enough 
income that the family is not entitled to in-work support. 



































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 



































































































52 Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 
The results of decomposition analyses of the mean incentive to progress are shown in 
Figure 3.19 and 3.20.  The key results are the following:  
•  the tax and benefit systems between 1980 and 1987 produced weaker incentives 
to progress, on average, than that of 1979; those between 1988 and 1998 
produced stronger incentives to progress, on average, for both fathers and 
mothers, than in 1979. The impact of tax and benefit changes since the second 
half of the 1990s has been to weaken, on average, incentives to progress. For 
fathers, the combined effect of real tax and benefit changes over the whole 
period has been to weaken incentives to progress compared to 1979; for mothers, 
it has been to strengthen them.  
•  Changes in the wages received by men in couples with dependent children have 
had little impact, on average, on their incentives to progress; amongst women in 
couples with dependent children, though, such changes have weakened incentives 
to progress, presumably because more of these women are now earning enough 
to pay income tax.  
•  Rises in the real level of rents have had small but negative impacts on incentives 
to progress, by extending the range of earnings consistent with eligibility to 
housing benefit.  




































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
Figure 3.20. Understanding changes in the mean EMTR amongst working 



































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
54 Summary:  
Growth in real earnings led to a gradual strengthening of the incentive to be in 
work for men and women in couples with children from the early 1980s to the late 
1990s, but tax and benefit changes weakened incentives to work both before and 
after this period. 
Higher earnings amongst working mothers has meant that more of them now pay 
income tax than in 1979, dulling incentives to progress. Aside from this, the main 
change to incentives to progress for adults in couples with children took place 
since the late 1990s, with the expansion of in-work support weakening incentives 
to progress for a minority. 
Single people without children: incentive to work at all 
As chapter 2 showed, single people without children have the strongest incentives to 
work at all, on average, because they would be entitled to little income from benefits if 
they did not work. Indeed, the replacement rates of single individuals without children 
with relatively weak incentives to work are very similar to those of lone parents with 
relatively strong incentives.  
Since the early 1980s, replacement rates and participation tax rates for full-time work for 
single people without children have declined almost continuously, with the median 
replacement rate falling by 6 percentage points over the entire period (Figure 3.21). Not 
all the population has experienced the same strengthening: those with the weakest 
incentives have generally seen the least strengthening.25 Between the mid 1990s and 2003, 
PTRs rose but RRs continued to fall (Figure 3.22). 
                                                 
25 Part-time replacement rates for single people without children are higher than those for full-time work (about 20 
percentage points at the median) and the distribution is more dispersed. However, the trends are very similar to those 
for full-time work. Financial work incentives for non-workers are weaker than those for workers: the median 
replacement rate is around 5 percentage points higher. Over time, financial work incentives for non-working single 
people without children have changed little at the median, and have weakened at the 75th percentile point, with 
strengthening only at the 25th percentile, amongst those with already relatively strong financial work incentives.  
55 Figure 3.21. Changes in the full-time replacement rate amongst working single 























































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
56 Figure 3.22. Changes in the full-time PTR amongst working single people 































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
 
The decomposition analysis, shown in Figure 3.23, suggests the following:  
•  As for the population as a whole, the tax and benefit systems between 1980 and 
1989 led to weaker average incentives to work at all than that of 1979; those since 
1989 have led to stronger incentives. 
•  This change, though, is much smaller than the strengthening caused by changes 
in wages received by single adults without children.  
•  Real growth in rents and all other changes have weakened incentives to work at 
all. 
57 Figure 3.23. Understanding changes in the median full-time replacement rate 























































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours.  
Single people without children: incentive to progress 
Figure 3.24 shows the changes in the financial incentives to progress facing single adults. 
The general trend is familiar: incentives strengthened between the early 1980s and the 
late 1990s, but got weaker outside this period. There is also increasing dispersion of 
incentives over time. 

































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 
A decomposition analysis (Figure 3.25) shows that: 
•  the tax and benefit systems between 1980 and 1987 led to weaker incentives to 
progress than that of 1979; those since 1987 have led to stronger incentives. 
However, changes since 2002 have been weakening average incentives to 
progress.  
•  Increases in wages have slightly strengthened incentives to progress, but real 
growth in rents and all other changes have weakened incentives to progress. 
 
59 Figure 3.25. Understanding changes in the mean EMTR amongst working single 




































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
Summary:  
Single adults without children faced relatively strong incentives to work even in 
1979.  Real wage growth since then has strengthened this further, as have tax and 
benefit changes. 
Incentives to progress strengthened for most of the period, but weakened in the 
early 1980s, and have been weakening since the late 1990s: these changes are 
driven by real tax and benefit changes. 
Couples without children: incentive to work at all 
Over time, incentives for working men in couples without children to work full-time 
have changed in a similar way to those for single people without children (see Figures 
3.26 and 3.27). Incentives to work at all tended to weaken between 1979 and 1986, 
strengthen between 1986 and the late 1990s, and have slightly weakened in recent years. 
As with most other groups examined so far, the dispersion of incentives to work at all 
has widened: the weakest incentives have strengthened by less than the strongest.  
Over the same period, the median replacement rate for working women in couples 
without children has also fallen, by around 5 percentage points (Figure 3.28). This 
reduction is very similar in magnitude to that experienced by working men in couples 
without children, but the declines took place at different points in time: for men, much 
of the reduction occurred between the mid 1980s and the early 1990s; for women, the 
reduction began in the early 1990s.  As with men, we see increasing dispersion over time, 
60 although the distribution of RRs is less dispersed than for men. Trends in PTRs (Figure 
3.29) are broadly the same, although the weakening at the start and the end of the whole 
period is more noticeable than with the RR. 26  
                                                 
26 The replacement rates of non-workers in couples without children (not shown here) has changed by little since 1979, 
with strengthening of financial work incentives limited to women in the most recent few years. 
61 Figure 3.26 Changes in the full-time replacement rate amongst working men in 






















































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 
Figure 3.27. Changes in the full-time PTR amongst working men in couples 































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 
62 Figure 3.28. Changes in the full-time replacement rate amongst working women 






















































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
 
63 Figure 3.29 Changes in the full-time PTR amongst working women in couples 































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 




Decomposition analysis of the changes in the median replacement rates of men and 
women in couples without children (Figures 3.30 and 3.31) suggests the following:  
•  The tax and benefit systems from 1980 to 1987 tended to produce weaker 
incentives to work than those in 1979; systems after that date tended to lead to 
stronger incentives. Tax and benefit changes since 2000 have been weakening the 
incentive to work at all. 
•  Changes in the wages received by adults in couples have led to a substantial 
strengthening of the incentive to work at all.  
•  Changes in real rents, and all other changes, have all tended to weaken the 




64 Figure 3.30 Understanding changes in the median full-time replacement rate 





















































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours. 
 
Figure 3.31 Understanding changes in the median full-time replacement rate 





















































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
65 Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours.   
Couples without children: incentive to progress 
The distribution of EMTRs for men in couples without children is shown in Figure 3.32. 
The distribution is relatively narrow – with the median and 25th centile very close to the 
EMTR faced by a basic-rate taxpayer – and the changes over time have been small: 
incentives to progress generally weakened between 1979 and 1983, strengthened between 
1983 and 1990, and weakened slightly between 2000 and 2003. The exception to this is 
the trend amongst the weakest incentives to work: the 90th centile of the EMTR 
distribution has risen since 1988. 
The pattern is similar for working women in couples without children (Figure 3.33). As 
with working women in couples with children, the 10th centile reflects a small group of 
women who earn too little to pay income tax in some years during our sample period.  

































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Rates evaluated at 40 
hours.  Figure shows, from bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the 
distribution. 
 





































































































Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. Figure shows, from 
bottom to top, the changes in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution. 
 
Decomposition analysis of the changes in the mean EMTRs of men and women in 
couples without children (Figures 3.34 and 3.35) suggests the following:  
67 •  The tax and benefit systems from 1980 to 1987 tended to produce weaker 
incentives to progress than those in 1979; systems after that date tended to lead 
to stronger incentives. Since 1999 (men) or 2002 (women), though, tax and 
benefit changes have been weakening incentives to progress.  
•  Changes in the wages received by adults in couples without children has led to a 
small weakening in incentives to progress compared to 1979.  
•  Changes in real rents have tended to weaken incentives to progress. 
 
68 Figure 3.34. Understanding changes in the mean EMTR amongst working men 

































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes Excludes families 
containing any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
Figure 3.35. Understanding changes in the mean EMTR amongst working 


































































Tax Wages Rents Residual
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using various years of FES/FRS and TAXBEN. Excludes families containing 
any adults aged over 55, the self-employed, or adults receiving a disability benefit. 
69 Summary:  
For both men and women in couples without children, the tax and benefit 
systems of the early and mid 1980s had weaker incentives (both incentives to work 
at all and incentives to progress) than those of the 1990s and 2000s. But the work 
incentives inherent in the tax and benefit system of 2005 are generally weaker 
than they were in 1999. 
Growth in wages, particularly for women in couples without children, has also 
been very important in explaining the strengthening of the incentive to work at 
all.  
3.3  Bringing it all together 
What can we say about the main determinants of the changes in work incentives? 
Considering the incentive to work at all: 
•  Growth in real wages over the period has tended to strengthen the incentive to 
work at all, as measured by the replacement rate. 
•  Over the 26 year period, real tax and benefit changes have strengthened 
incentives to work at all. The pattern has not been even, though. Generally, the 
tax and benefit systems in the early and mid 1980s led to weaker work incentives 
than that in 1979, those of the 1990s and 2000s led to stronger incentives: 
incentives crossed their 1979 level at some point between 1985 and 1989, 
depending on the measure. Real tax and benefit changes between 1979 and 1983 
tended to weaken the incentive to work at all, those between 1983 and the late 
1990s tended to strengthen it, but the most recent changes have tended to 
weaken it once more for most (not all) groups.   
•  Other changes in the economy, such as the growth in real rents acting through 
housing benefit, have tended to reduce the incentive to work at all. 
The median incentive to progress is dominated by the large proportion of people whose 
EMTR is determined by the basic rate of income tax plus the national insurance 
contributions rate; changes in the median EMTR have been driven largely by real tax and 
benefit changes. For a more informative analysis, we decomposed changes in the mean, 
and found that:  
•  Changes in real wages since 1979 have had little net effect on average incentives 
to progress, only weakening them slightly. Increases in wages will tend to 
strengthen incentives to progress for adults who become too rich to quality for 
means-tested benefits or tax credits, or too rich to pay National Insurance 
contributions on their extra earnings, but weaken it for those who move onto 
higher income tax rates; our analysis suggests, therefore, that the last of these 
effects dominated, on average, over this whole period. 
•  Across the whole population, and over the 26 year period, real tax and benefit 
changes since 1979 have strengthened incentives to progress given current wage 
70 levels. The pattern has not been even, though: between 1979 and 1983, real tax 
and benefit changes tended to weaken the incentive to work, between 1983 and 
the late 1990s, they tended to strengthen it, but the most recent changes have 
tended to weaken it once more. In particular, the average EMTR has risen by 
almost 3 percentage points since 1999 through tax and benefit changes. 
•  This result is not true across all six of the groups we have investigated: amongst 
lone parents and fathers in couples, the tax and benefit system of 2005–06 leads 
to weaker incentives to progress, on average, than that in 1979, reflecting the 
expansion of in-work support to low-income parents.  
Other trends have affected the distribution of incentives to progress: 
•  Higher wages amongst women have meant that fewer of them have incomes so 
low as to not pay any income tax, and this has tended to weaken average 
incentives to progress. 
•  As mentioned earlier, the general expansion of in-work support, particularly in 
1992 and since 1999, has tended to weaken incentives to progress amongst some 
working parents. However, reforms since 1999 have strengthened some of the 
weakest incentives to progress experienced by lone parents. 
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